ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) and its successor ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network) constitute the central IT system for all maintenance and logistics planning of the F-35 fleet [80]. Without ALIS/ODIN, flight operations are impossible [80]. All data flows through Lockheed Martin servers in Fort Worth, Texas [48].
The DOT&E report of 2017 listed approximately 1,000 open deficiencies, of which 301 were high priority, and only 88 (29%) were being addressed [81]. ALIS data are often incomplete or erroneous; contractors do not rely on the system for their own work [82]. Faulty inventory data lead to unexpected groundings of mission-ready aircraft [83].
All F-35 mission data -- flight routes, mission protocols, sensor recordings, communications metadata -- are transmitted to Lockheed Martin servers in the United States [84]. Partner countries have no granular control over their own data [84]. Norwegian F-35s transmit detailed telemetry of all pilot actions to the Lockheed Martin facility in Fort Worth [85].
Two F-35 partner countries threatened to withdraw from the programme due to concerns about data flows [86]. A Sovereign Data Management Solution was developed for some countries but does not change the fundamental dependency [87].
Officially, there is no remote kill switch [88]. However, the real dependency exists through the Mission Data Files (MDF): without current MDFs, F-35s are far less capable and more vulnerable. By cutting off maintenance support, spare parts deliveries, software updates and network access, F-35s could still fly but would be significantly more vulnerable and difficult to keep airworthy in the long term [89].
Only Israel operates a completely independent system: the F-35I "Adir" features Israeli-developed mission software, separate maintenance at Nevatim Air Base without Lockheed Martin logistics, and direct access to source codes [16][17][90]. This autonomy was achieved at Israel's own expense.
The F/A-18 was maintained autonomously by RUAG -- software maintained locally, without US dependency [61]. For the F-35, maintenance specifications are still being defined. RUAG is permitted to assemble and test 4 of 36 jets but requires Lockheed Martin support [62]. Final acceptance takes place in Italy [63].
For a neutral state whose entire mission data are transmitted to US servers, this constitutes a fundamental sovereignty issue.
Translated from the German version. See the German version for complete references.