Switzerland made the type selection in favour of the F-35A Lightning II in June 2021. The procurement contract was signed in September 2022 [1][2].
| Parameter | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Type selection | 30 June 2021 | [1] |
| Contract signature | September 2022 | [2] |
| Popular vote | 27 September 2020, 50.1% Yes (8'670 votes difference) | [3] |
| Subject of the vote | Financial framework of CHF 6 billion for new combat aircraft (not about the type) | [3] |
| Original quantity | 36 F-35A | [1] |
| Budget | CHF 6 billion (Federal Decree) | [4] |
| Procurement route | Foreign Military Sales (FMS) via US Government | [2] |
Current situation (December 2025): The Federal Council tasked the DDPS (Department of Defence) with procuring the "maximum possible number" of F-35A within the financial framework of 6 billion francs [4]. The wording "maximum possible number" instead of the original 36 units signals a reduction to 35 or fewer aircraft due to increased prices [5][6][7].
Fixed-price promise broken: The USA unilaterally announced additional costs of CHF 650 million to 1.3 billion francs in summer 2025 [5][6][8]. The head of armaments procurement specified the range of additional costs to the media [8]. The original assurance of a fixed price is thus effectively void.
The fleet-wide availability rate of the F-35 has been declining over the past five years according to the GAO. None of the three variants (F-35A, F-35B, F-35C) meets the availability targets set by the US Department of Defense [9][10].
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Fleet-wide MC Rate (2023/2024) | approx. 51-55% | [9] |
| Availability trend | Declining over 5 years | [9] |
| MUST requirement Switzerland | >80% | Derived from fleet size [4][11] |
| Consequence with 35 jets and 51% MC Rate | ~18 mission-capable | Calculation |
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Cost per Flight Hour (CPFH) | USD 34'000-36'000 (GAO 2024) | [9] |
| Cost per aircraft/year (Steady State) | USD 7.5 million (above the target of USD 6.8 million) | [9] |
| Global sustainment costs (2018) | USD 1.1 trillion (estimate) | [9][12] |
| Global sustainment costs (2023) | USD 1.58 trillion (estimate) | [9][12] |
| Increase | +44% in 5 years | [9][12] |
| Total programme costs (life cycle) | >USD 2 trillion | [12] |
Canada decided to purchase 88 F-35A in 2022. The report by the Canadian Auditor General (June 2025) documents massive cost overruns [13][14]:
| Parameter | Original estimate | Current estimate (2024) | Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procurement costs | CAD 19 billion | CAD 27.7 billion | +46% |
| Worst case | -- | CAD 33.2 billion | +75% |
| Infrastructure | Not fully budgeted | Billions in additional costs | -- |
Additionally, the Auditor General identified: construction delays at fighter squadron facilities (>3 years behind schedule), looming pilot shortage, and missing risk management plans for currency and inflation risks [13][14].
The Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) processor upgrade, a prerequisite for Block 4 with enhanced capabilities, is massively delayed. The GAO reports ongoing delivery delays [15].
The USA itself plans to fly the F-35 less than originally envisaged -- partly due to reliability problems [12].
The F-35A is entirely subject to US export control law (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR). This has far-reaching consequences for Switzerland as a neutral small state [16][17].
| Restriction | Impact for Switzerland | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Deployment authorisation | USA can attach conditions to deployment or relocation | [16] |
| Maintenance restrictions | Certain maintenance tasks require US-certified personnel | [16] |
| Weapons integration | Integration of non-American weapons requires US approval | [16] |
| Software updates | Mission software updates are released exclusively upon US clearance | [18] |
| Technology transfer | Sharing technical documentation with Swiss engineers is subject to US approval | [16] |
| Re-export prohibition | No resale to third countries without US approval | [16] |
The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), now renamed ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network), is the IT backbone of the F-35. It collects maintenance, logistics, and tactical data (flight routes, detected threats) and shares these globally with all F-35 operators [19][20].
Non-US partners have repeatedly raised concerns regarding data sovereignty and cybersecurity [19]. While ODIN is intended to be owned by the US Department of Defense rather than the manufacturer (unlike ALIS), the cloud backbone runs on commercial US hyperscalers (Microsoft, Amazon) [20].
The Mission Data Files contain highly sensitive intelligence information about adversary threats -- radar profiles, electronic order of battle, weapon parameters. Only the USA creates and controls these files [21][22]:
The F-35 mission software comprises over 25 million lines of code, entirely under US control. No partner country receives read or audit rights. Switzerland cannot conduct independent security audits of the mission software [18].
Spare parts are distributed through a global pool that depends on US prioritisation. Autonomous Swiss spare parts stockpiling for months -- as required for a neutral state -- is not provided for in the F-35 system.
No physical switch is needed to ground an F-35 fleet. Withholding spare parts, software updates, or MDF updates degrades a fleet operationally within 30-60 days [23][24].
| Case | Measure | Consequence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey (2019) | Purchase of Russian S-400 system | Exclusion from F-35 programme, CAATSA sanctions | [25] |
| UAE (2021) | Huawei/5G concerns | F-35 deal effectively collapsed | [26] |
| Pakistan | F-16 operational restrictions over decades | Restricted sovereignty over maintenance and deployment | [25] |
These cases demonstrate that the USA employs ITAR restrictions as a foreign policy leverage tool -- regardless of existing contracts.
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe's security-political landscape. The transformation of Russian armed forces under the pressure of attrition warfare -- from classical mechanised doctrine towards drone-based warfare with industrial mass production -- has direct implications for European security [27][28][29].
Hypersonic Weapons:
| Weapon system | Speed | Range | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) | Mach 10 (Russian claims; Ukrainian measurements: approx. Mach 3.6) | 500-2'000 km | In service (Ukraine) | [30] |
| Zircon (SS-N-33) | Mach 8-9 | 250-500 km | In service since Feb. 2024 (Ukraine) | [30][31] |
Drone Swarms: The Russian war economy produces Shahed-136/Geranium-2 drones in large quantities. In October 2025, Russia deployed approximately 5'300 Shahed drones, 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles against Ukraine -- a threefold increase compared to the same period the previous year [32]. The cost asymmetry is fundamental: a Shahed drone costs USD 20'000-50'000, a Patriot interceptor missile USD 3-4 million -- a ratio of 1:150 [33].
Hybrid Warfare: Russia is already conducting a hybrid war against Europe, encompassing espionage, sabotage, cyber attacks, and disinformation [34]. GRU sabotage operations against European infrastructure are documented.
The Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) published the 2025 situation report "Security Switzerland 2025" with a historically unprecedented assessment [35][36].
The NDB's threat radar shows 15 flashpoints simultaneously [35]. Switzerland is not an observer but an affected party in the global confrontation.
Specific Threats:
| Threat | Description | Relevance for Air Defence |
|---|---|---|
| Alps as radar shadow | Low-flying cruise missiles exploit terrain masking in Alpine valleys; FLORAKO radar ends at the border | Conventional radar coverage has gaps |
| Transit corridor | Switzerland as potential transit corridor for air strikes on NATO targets | Protecting neutrality requires airspace control |
| Topographic blindness | Valleys without look-down capability for ground-based radar systems | Combat aircraft with look-down/shoot-down capability needed |
| Time problem | Hypersonic weapons from Austrian border to Bern: <45 seconds at Mach 8 | National early warning alone is insufficient |
| Vulnerable CRITIS | Energy grid, financial centre (SIX), logistics (Rhine), railways | Must be defensible from the air |
| Espionage hub | Geneva/Bern as targets of Russian and Chinese intelligence services (NDB 2025) | Heightened threat in the run-up to conflicts |
Sources: NDB Situation Report 2025 [35], SWP 2023 [37], armasuisse Hypersonic [38], RUSI 2024/2025 [27][28]
The threat analysis yields three compelling conclusions:
Purely national defence is insufficient. Reaction times against hypersonic weapons are too short for a country with the dimensions of Switzerland. Without European early warning, critical seconds to minutes are lost.
European early warning (ESSI) is physically necessary. The "Recognised Air Picture" (RAP) extends the detection horizon by 300-500 km beyond Swiss borders and gives air defence the required warning time [39][40].
Suspension clause preserves neutrality. Switzerland issued a unilateral declaration upon its ESSI accession (October 2024) that enables withdrawal from the cooperation in the event of an armed conflict involving an ESSI member [39][40][41].
The Swiss Air Force has two core missions:
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| LP-001 | 24/7 QRA capability with at least 2 armed aircraft on standby | MUST | Operationally implemented since 2021 [42] |
| LP-002 | Reaction time: launch within 15 minutes of alert | MUST | QRA standard [42] |
| LP-003 | Identification and interception throughout Swiss airspace | MUST | ~10 Hot Missions, ~200 Live Missions/year [42] |
| LP-004 | Visual identification (day and night) | MUST | Night-flight capability with infrared/night vision |
| LP-005 | Escort and controlled diversion of civil aircraft | MUST | Standard procedure for airspace violations |
| LP-006 | Security for major events (WEF, UN conferences) | MUST | Regular tasking [43] |
| LP-007 | Autonomous operation without dependence on foreign systems | MUST | Neutrality principle [44] |
| LP-008 | Low operating costs per flight hour | SHOULD | Budget constraint [4] |
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| LV-001 | Air superiority: air combat BVR and WVR | MUST | Core mission [11] |
| LV-002 | Engagement of cruise missiles and ballistic targets (with BODLUV) | MUST | Changed threat landscape [11][35] |
| LV-003 | MC Rate >80% in emergency | MUST | With 35 or fewer aircraft, every single one is critical [4] |
| LV-004 | Decentralisation: operations from multiple bases | MUST | Federal Council has decided on decentralisation [45] |
| LV-005 | Cavern compatibility (Meiringen) | SHOULD | Only active cavern airbase [46] |
| LV-006 | EMCON operations (emission control, minimal radiation) | SHOULD | Survivability [11] |
| LV-007 | Endurance: autonomous operations for weeks without external resupply | MUST | Neutrality requires logistical independence [11][44] |
| LV-008 | Airborne reconnaissance and target assignment for BODLUV | SHOULD | Integration with Patriot [11][47] |
| LV-009 | Integration into networked air defence system | MUST | Air2030 as an overall system [11][47] |
| LV-010 | Fleet size: 55-70 (expert report), realistic 28-36 (budget) | CRITICAL | Expert group vs. Federal Council [4][11] |
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| TA-001 | Modern AESA radar | MUST | State of the art |
| TA-002 | Fused Situational Awareness (complete sensor fusion) | MUST | Decisive combat capability advantage |
| TA-003 | BVR combat capability (AMRAAM or Meteor) | MUST | First-engagement survivability [11] |
| TA-004 | WVR combat capability (AIM-9X or IRIS-T) + internal gun | MUST | Air policing and close combat |
| TA-005 | Electronic warfare (EW suite) | MUST | Survivability |
| TA-006 | NATO-compatible data links (Link 16) + autonomous operation | MUST | Interoperability without membership [44] |
| TA-007 | European SATCOM solution (without dependence on US MILSATCOM) | MUST | Sovereign communication in emergency [11][44] |
| TA-008 | Stealth characteristics (reduced radar cross-section) | SHOULD | Survivability advantage, but not mandatory for air policing |
| TA-009 | Supercruise or >Mach 1.5 | SHOULD | Rapid area coverage in Alpine terrain |
| TA-010 | Combat radius min. 500 nm | SHOULD | Full airspace coverage from any airbase |
| TA-011 | Night combat and all-weather capability | MUST | 24/7 operations |
| TA-012 | Growth potential (30+ years) | SHOULD | Service life until 2060+ [4] |
| TA-013 | Silent Attack: engagement without own radar emission | MUST | Survivability |
In modern air combat, every active radar emission reveals one's own position. Modern ESM systems detect adversary radar emissions at distances two to three times the radar's own detection range. A combat aircraft that aims to survive in an emergency must possess low-emission or fully passive engagement options.
| Method | Function | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| ARM (Anti-Radiation Missile) | Missiles that home on hostile radar emissions (e.g. AGM-88 HARM/AARGM) | Engaging air defence radars without own radar emission |
| HOJ (Home-on-Jam) | Missiles with HOJ capability home on adversary jammers | Punishing electronic countermeasures |
| IRST-based Targeting | Purely optical/infrared-based weapon employment via IRST system | Fully passive air-to-air engagement |
| Third-Party Targeting | Passive sensors + target data via encrypted data links (Link 16) from other platforms | Network-centric combat: one aircraft locates, another engages |
EMCON profile (Emission Control): The entire silent attack sequence is conducted under radio silence: no active radar, no active data link transmitter, no radio emissions. The aircraft operates with passive sensors (ESM, IRST) and receives data links in receive-only mode.
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| SO-001 | Autonomous operation without clearance from manufacturer country | MUST | Neutrality obligation, kill switch risk |
| SO-002 | Open System Architecture (OSA): documented interfaces, modular design | MUST | Long-term independence |
| SO-003 | Source code access: at least read/audit rights, ideally modification rights | MUST | Security audits, national adaptations [18][49] |
| SO-004 | No ITAR lock-in | MUST | ITAR grants de facto veto power; incompatible with neutrality [16][17] |
| SO-005 | Transfer of Technology (ToT): contractual technology transfer | MUST | Independent maintenance, endurance capability |
| SO-006 | Integration of non-American weapons and sensors | MUST | Flexibility in armament (Meteor, IRIS-T, European EW) |
An open system architecture means documented, standardised interfaces instead of a monolithic black box:
Counter-example F-35: ALIS/ODIN as a proprietary system in which all maintenance data is transmitted to Lockheed Martin [19]. No insight into data flows for Switzerland.
ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is the US export control law for defence articles [16]. For every weapon system containing US components: deployment, maintenance, weapons integration, and technology transfer require US approval. A combat aircraft under full ITAR control is de facto not deployable with sovereignty.
Important distinction: European combat aircraft may also partially contain US components (e.g. Gripen E: GE F414 engine, approx. 1/3 US components [50][51]). The decisive factor is the degree of dependency: a single replaceable engine represents a different risk profile than a system that is entirely under ITAR (F-35). European export regimes (France, Sweden, Eurofighter consortium) are demonstrably less restrictive for neutral buyers [17][52].
| ToT Level | Description | Priority |
|---|---|---|
| Level 1: Maintenance | Swiss enterprises carry out all maintenance levels independently | MUST |
| Level 2: Component Repair | Repair of key components (engine, radar, EW) in Switzerland | MUST |
| Level 3: Software Adaptation | National adaptations (cryptography, data link profiles, tactical databases) | MUST |
| Level 4: Partial Manufacturing | Manufacturing of selected components in Switzerland (offset) | SHOULD |
| Level 5: Weapons Integration | Independent integration and certification of armaments | SHOULD |
Reference model Brazil-Sweden: Brazil received comprehensive technology transfer with the Gripen E purchase: source code access, local final assembly at Embraer, participation in software development, training of over 350 Brazilian specialists in Sweden [49][53]. This is considered the benchmark for ToT.
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| PO-001 | Compatibility with Swiss neutrality | MUST | Constitutional basis [44] |
| PO-002 | Parliamentary and democratic legitimacy | MUST | Air2030: 50.1% Yes [3] |
| PO-003 | Offset agreements: at least 60% of procurement value | MUST | Legal requirement [48] |
| PO-004 | Budget: max. CHF 6 billion | MUST | Federal Decree [4] |
| PO-005 | Plausible life-cycle cost estimate with reserves | MUST | Canadian experience: +46% [13] |
| PO-006 | Cooperation with neighbouring states without NATO membership | SHOULD | Air situational awareness, joint exercises [44][47] |
| ID | Requirement | Priority | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| IF-001 | Operations from 3 active airbases (Payerne, Emmen, Meiringen) | MUST | Existing infrastructure [45] |
| IF-002 | Operations from alternate locations (civilian airfields, motorway sections) | SHOULD | Decentralisation [45] |
| IF-003 | Cavern compatibility (Meiringen) | SHOULD | Cavern converted for F/A-18 (CHF 120 million) [46] |
| IF-004 | Runway length: operations from 2'000 m | SHOULD | Meiringen: 2'020 m, Payerne: 2'985 m |
| IF-005 | Fuel compatibility (JP-8 / Jet A-1) | MUST | Standard |
The three European combat aircraft that come into consideration for Swiss procurement:
The weighting follows the AHP method (Analytic Hierarchy Process) and prioritises the requirements classified as MUST:
| Criterion | Weighting | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereignty (OSA, source code, ITAR freedom, ToT) | 25% | MUST requirements SO-001 to SO-006; existential for a neutral state |
| Availability (MC Rate) | 20% | MUST requirement LO-001/LV-003; vital for survival with a small fleet |
| Operating costs (CPFH, LCC) | 15% | SHOULD requirement LO-003; determines flight hour production within budget |
| Effectiveness (air combat, sensor fusion) | 15% | MUST requirements TA-001 to TA-013 |
| Switzerland compatibility (infrastructure, decentralisation) | 10% | MUST requirements IF-001 to IF-005, LV-004 |
| Offsets and industrial participation | 10% | MUST requirement PO-003 |
| Cooperation with neighbouring states | 5% | SHOULD requirement PO-006 |
| Criterion | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereignty | 4/5 | Most comprehensive source code access of all Western combat aircraft (reference: Brazil contract with access to mission software and local final assembly [49][53]). Open avionics architecture, documented interfaces. Limitation: Approx. 1/3 US components, in particular GE F414 engine (RM16), subject to ITAR [50][51]. This is a lower risk than with the F-35 (entire system under ITAR), but not negligible. |
| Availability | 5/5 | Gripen C/D: regularly >90% MC Rate, peaks of 95% [54]. Gripen E at CRUZEX 2024 (Brazil): almost every day all seven aircraft were available on the flight line [55]. In the Swiss evaluation, the Gripen E achieved over 85% with minimal support [54]. |
| Operating costs | 5/5 | Lowest CPFH of all Western combat jets in this class [56]. Single-engine design structurally reduces fuel and maintenance costs. |
| Effectiveness | 3/5 | Leonardo Raven ES-05 AESA radar with innovative repositionable antenna (+-100 degrees field of regard) [57]. Meteor integration (BVR) and IRIS-T (WVR). Good sensor fusion. Limitation: Lower payload and range than Rafale/Eurofighter (single-engine, lighter platform). |
| Switzerland compatibility | 5/5 | Explicitly designed for decentralised operations: road-base starts, short runways, small logistic footprints, rapid turnaround [53]. Ideal for the Swiss doctrine with 3 airbases and alternate locations. |
| Offsets | 5/5 | The Brazil model demonstrates maximum ToT with local final assembly. Colombia (2025): USD 3.6 billion contract with comprehensive offsets [58]. Saab explicitly offered Canada 12'600 jobs for 72 Gripen [59]. |
| Cooperation | 3/5 | No direct neighbouring country operates Gripen. NATO-compatible via Link 16. Sweden, as a formerly neutral state, historically understands Swiss requirements better than large NATO industrial nations. |
Weighted overall score Gripen E: 4.35 / 5.00
| Criterion | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereignty | 4/5 | Dassault deliberately designed the Rafale to be ITAR-free [52][60]. Limitation: Source code access negotiable but not guaranteed -- France refused India source code access for 114 Rafale (2026) [62]. |
| Availability | 4/5 | Armee de l'Air: 75-80% MC Rate [54][63]. Significantly above F-35 levels, but below Gripen values. |
| Operating costs | 3/5 | EUR 14'000-20'000 CPFH (French figures) [63]. Twin-engine design increases fuel consumption. |
| Effectiveness | 5/5 | RBE2 AESA radar (Thales), SPECTRA EW suite, Meteor + MICA armament, IRST. Combat-proven: Operations in Mali, Libya, Syria, Iraq over decades [60]. |
| Switzerland compatibility | 3/5 | Larger, heavier platform than Gripen E. Not primarily designed for decentralised operations. However, twin engines offer a safety advantage in case of single engine failure over the Alps. |
| Offsets | 3/5 | France offers ToT, but with limitations. Offset quotas historically lower than with Saab. |
| Cooperation | 4/5 | France is a direct neighbour. Armee de l'Air operates Rafale. Joint exercises and airspace coordination already established. |
Weighted overall score Rafale F4: 3.80 / 5.00
| Criterion | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereignty | 3/5 | European export controls (less restrictive than ITAR). Limitation: Consortium structure (4 nations) complicates decisions. Germany has blocked exports in the past. Tranche 4 with ECRS Mk 1 uses Open Architecture Mission System [64][65]. |
| Availability | 3/5 | Approx. 60-70% MC Rate. Maintenance effort higher than with Gripen and Rafale [66]. |
| Operating costs | 2/5 | Highest CPFH of the three European candidates. Approx. EUR 36'000 (UniBw Munich 2013) to USD 60'000-65'000 (more recent estimates) [66][67]. |
| Effectiveness | 4/5 | Captor-E AESA radar (ECRS Mk 1) for Tranche 4 [64][65]. Meteor integration, good flight performance (supercruise). Pirate IRST as standard. |
| Switzerland compatibility | 3/5 | Larger platform, not designed for decentralised operations. Requires fully-fledged military airbases. |
| Offsets | 4/5 | Germany and Italy are neighbouring countries and consortium partners. Potential for comprehensive industrial participation. |
| Cooperation | 5/5 | Germany, Italy, and Austria operate or are procuring Eurofighter -- all are neighbouring states of Switzerland. |
Weighted overall score Eurofighter Typhoon T4: 3.20 / 5.00
| Rank | Candidate | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gripen E | 4.35 / 5.00 |
| 2 | Rafale F4 | 3.80 / 5.00 |
| 3 | Eurofighter Typhoon T4 | 3.20 / 5.00 |
The Gripen E achieves the highest score due to its superior combination of sovereignty, availability, operating costs, and Switzerland compatibility. Limitation on effectiveness: The Gripen E has the lowest rating in effectiveness (3/5). The single-engine, lighter platform has lower payload and range than Rafale or Eurofighter. For the Swiss scenarios (air policing, air defence within own airspace), this is acceptable.
Configuration: 55-60 Gripen E (or another European type)
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
Realistic assessment: This option would be ideal based on requirements, but due to the existing contract is politically hardly feasible, unless cost overruns become so massive that a contract exit becomes economically justifiable.
Configuration: 15 F-35A + 35 Gripen E = 50 combat aircraft
| Item | Quantity | Unit price (estimated, incl. initial logistics) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| F-35A | 15 | approx. CHF 190 million | CHF 2.85 billion |
| Gripen E | 35 | approx. CHF 90 million (based on Brazil/Colombia deals [49][58]) | CHF 3.15 billion |
| Total | 50 | -- | CHF 6.00 billion |
Note on unit prices: Gripen E unit prices vary considerably depending on contract configuration. For this calculation, a conservative average of CHF 90 million is used, which includes a solid logistics and ToT package. The actual costs would need to be determined in a formal evaluation.
| Mission | F-35A (15 units) | Gripen E (35 units) |
|---|---|---|
| Air policing 24/7 QRA | Reserve / peak demand | Primary (low CPFH, high MC Rate) |
| Air defence emergency | Primary (sensor fusion, BVR, networked combat) | Secondary (WVR, reconnaissance, support) |
| Training | Secondary | Primary (lower costs, higher availability) |
| Routine operations / major events | Secondary (preserving expensive flight hours) | Primary |
| Configuration | Fleet size | MC Rate | Mission-capable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 35 or fewer F-35A (Status Quo) | max. 35 | approx. 51% [9] | ~18 |
| 15 F-35A + 35 Gripen E (Option B) | 50 | F-35: 51%, Gripen: 90% | ~8 F-35 + ~32 Gripen = ~40 |
Feasibility: Switzerland operated the F/A-18 Hornet, F-5 Tiger, and Mirage III simultaneously until 2003 -- three types in parallel. Canada is actively discussing a mixed-fleet approach with F-35 and Gripen E in 2026 [59][68].
Configuration: Maximum possible number of F-35A within the budget of CHF 6 billion (35 or fewer units)
Advantages:
Risks:
| Risk category | Description | Affected requirements |
|---|---|---|
| Full ITAR dependency | Entire weapon system under US export control | SO-001, SO-004, SO-005, SO-006 |
| MC Rate <80% | 51% fleet-wide availability; with 35 jets: only ~18 mission-capable | LO-001, LV-003, LV-010 |
| ALIS/ODIN data transfer | Maintenance and mission data flow to LM/US DoD | SO-002, SO-003 |
| MDF under US control | "Brain" of the jet not in Swiss hands | SO-001, SO-003, LV-007 |
| Cost overruns | +46% (Canada), +44% sustainment globally, CHF 0.65-1.3 billion additional costs CH | PO-004, PO-005, LO-003 |
| No source code | 25+ million lines of code under US control | SO-003, SO-005 |
| Smallest fleet | Max. 35 jets vs. expert requirement 55-70 | LV-010 |
Conclusion Option C: This is the highest-risk option. All sovereignty, availability, and cost risks remain. The fleet is the smallest of all three options and fails to meet several MUST requirements or meets them only under optimistic assumptions.
Switzerland signed the declaration of accession to ESSI on 17 October 2024 and is the 15th member of the initiative [39][40].
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Swiss accession | 17 October 2024 (MoU and declaration of accession) |
| Number of ESSI members | 15 (as of 2024) |
| Swiss procurement focus | Patriot (BODLUV) + IRIS-T SLM (5 systems, CHF 660 million) |
| Neutrality preservation | Unilateral declaration of accession with suspension clause |
Switzerland has set out its reservations under neutrality law in a public unilateral declaration of accession [40][41]:
| Technology | Description | Relevance for Switzerland | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Passive Coherent Location (PCL) | Passive radar (e.g. Hensoldt TwInvis): uses DAB+/5G signals, emits nothing, 250 km range | Ideal for Alpine valleys: DAB+ signals flood valleys, radar without emitting source | [69][70] |
| Acoustic Drone Detection | Sensor networks with AI-based sound recognition | Lessons Learned Ukraine: 14'000+ sensors, drone detection approx. 5 km | [71][72] |
| Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) | High-energy lasers (Rheinmetall Skyranger 30 HEL, 20-100 kW) | Against drones, <9 EUR/shot vs. millions for a missile | [73] |
| High-Power Microwave (HPM) | Epirus Leonidas: 49-drone swarm neutralised with a single pulse (100% success rate, Aug. 2025) | Cost efficiency: approx. 5 US cents/shot | [74] |
The analysis of MUST requirements, the threat landscape, and the European candidates leads to a clear recommendation: Option B -- a high-low mix of 15 F-35A and 35 Gripen E -- is the configuration that best fulfils the defined requirements.
| MUST Requirement | Option B (15 F-35 + 35 Gripen) | Option C (35 or fewer F-35) |
|---|---|---|
| SO-001: Autonomous operation | Basic operations (Gripen) sovereign | Fully dependent on US clearances |
| SO-004: No ITAR lock-in | Gripen proportion reduces overall dependency | Entire system under ITAR |
| LO-001/LV-003: MC Rate >80% | ~40 of 50 mission-capable (~80%) | ~18 of 35 mission-capable (~51%) |
| LV-007: Endurance capability | Gripen spare parts independently procurable | Complete dependency on US supply chains |
| LV-010: Fleet size | 50 aircraft | Max. 35 aircraft |
| PO-004: Budget CHF 6 billion | Within budget (15 x 190 + 35 x 90 = 6.0 billion) | Within budget (with reduction to 35 or fewer) |
| LO-003: CPFH | Average significantly lower (majority on Gripen) | USD 34'000-36'000 per hour |
| Risk | Option A (60 Gripen) | Option B (15 F-35 + 35 Gripen) | Option C (35 or fewer F-35) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sovereignty risk | Low | Medium (F-35 portion only) | High |
| Availability risk | Low (>90% MC) | Low (overall fleet ~80%) | High (51% MC) |
| Cost risk | Low | Medium (F-35 portion) | High (Canada: +46%) |
| Political risk | High (contract exit) | Medium (contract reduction) | Low (Status Quo) |
| Logistics complexity | Low (1 type) | Medium (2 types) | Low (1 type) |
| Capability gap sensor fusion | Medium | Low (F-35 for high-end) | Low |
| Fleet size risk | Low (55-60 jets) | Low (50 jets) | High (max. 35 jets) |
Option B offers the best compromise between:
The decision requires political courage, as it means a deviation from the existing plan. But the facts -- documented ITAR risks, 51% availability rate, +46% cost overrun in Canada, reduction to 35 or fewer units due to increased prices -- suggest that the existing plan does not meet its own requirements.
[1] Federal Council (2021): Air2030 -- Federal Council decides to procure 36 F-35A combat aircraft
[2] DDPS: Air2030 -- Protection of Airspace (contract overview)
[3] Federal Chancellery: Popular vote 27 September 2020 -- Procurement of new combat aircraft
[4] DDPS (December 2025): Air2030 -- Switzerland procures maximum possible number of F-35A
[5] SRF (2025): Switzerland procures fewer F-35 combat jets than expected
[6] NZZ (2025): Switzerland must accept additional costs for the F-35 combat jet procurement
[7] Flugrevue (2025): Switzerland reduces F-35 order due to exploding costs
[8] DDPS (June 2025): Air2030 -- Current challenges and further proceedings (fixed price)
[9] GAO-24-106703: F-35 Sustainment -- Costs Continue to Rise While Planned Use and Availability Have Decreased
[10] GAO-24-106703: F-35 Sustainment (PDF)
[11] DDPS (2017): Air Defence of the Future -- Expert Group Report NKF (PDF)
[12] GAO Blog (2024): The F-35 Will Now Exceed $2 Trillion As the Military Plans to Fly It Less
[13] The Globe and Mail (2025): Canada's F-35 fighter jets purchase will cost nearly 50% more than disclosed, A-G finds
[14] CBC News (2025): F-35 program facing skyrocketing costs, pilot shortage and infrastructure deficit: AG report
[15] GAO-25-107632: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- Actions Needed to Address Late Deliveries
[16] U.S. Department of State: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
[17] European Security & Defence (2022): ITAR-Related Obstacles to Exports
[18] USNI News (2014): Foreign F-35 Partners Allowed More Freedom to Customize Fighter Software
[19] Infodas: Solving data sovereignty issues with the F-35 ALIS/ODIN system
[20] Air & Space Forces Magazine: F-35 Program Dumps ALIS for ODIN
[21] Airforce Technology (2021): Norway receives F-35 mission data file from USAF
[22] flyajetfighter.com: F-35 flight data -- a strategic asset but a source of dependence on Washington
[23] The War Zone (2025): You Don't Need A Kill Switch To Hobble Exported F-35s
[24] The Aviationist (2025): The F-35 'Kill Switch' -- Separating Myth from Reality
[25] CSIS: The Great Unwinding -- The U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Dispute
[26] Simple Flying: Countries The United States Has Banned From Buying The F-35
[27] RUSI (2024): The Attritional Art of War -- Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine
[28] RUSI (2025): Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War (PDF)
[29] CSIS (2025): Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict
[30] armasuisse: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
[31] IFSH: Hypersonic Weapons in Europe (PDF)
[32] CSIS (2025): Russia's Intense Air Campaign in October
[33] Norsk Luftvern (2025): The Drone Defense Economics Crisis
[34] CSIS (2024): Russia's Shadow War Against the West
[35] DDPS/NDB (2025): "Security Switzerland 2025" -- Situation Report of the Federal Intelligence Service
[36] SRF (2025): NDB Situation Report
[37] SWP (2023): Russian Missiles and the European Sky Shield Initiative
[38] armasuisse: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
[39] Federal Council/DDPS (2024): Switzerland signs declaration of accession to ESSI
[40] admin.ch (2024): Switzerland Signs Declaration of Accession to ESSI
[41] Defense News (2024): Switzerland Squares Neutrality With Its European Air-Defense Push
[42] Cockpit.aero: Air Policing is Ready
[43] DDPS: Air2030 -- Protection of Airspace (major events)
[44] SEPOS: Switzerland's Security Policy Strategy 2026 (consultation)
[45] Blick (2025): Federal Council decides on Air Force decentralisation
[46] VTG: Military Airbase Meiringen (cavern)
[47] armasuisse: Air2030 Overall Programme
[48] armasuisse: Four Main Criteria and Multi-Criteria Analysis NKF
[49] Saab: Transfer of Technology -- Brazilian Gripen Programme
[50] Simple Flying: What European Fighter Jets Have Critical US Components?
[51] e-International Relations (2025): The Gripen Illusion -- Sweden's Fighter Jet is Under America's Thumb
[52] Defense News (2018): A jet sale to Egypt is being blocked by a US regulation, and France is over it
[53] Saab: Gripen E-series (product page)
[54] flyajetfighter.com: Actual availability rates for the F-22, Rafale, Su-35, and Gripen E
[55] Saab (2024): Gripen E excels at CRUZEX
[56] Stratpost/Jane's: Gripen operational cost lowest of all western fighters
[57] Leonardo: Raven ES-05 AESA Radar (product page)
[58] Breaking Defense (2025): Colombia signs $3.6B deal for Gripen fighters
[59] CBC News (2026): Saab wants Canada to buy 72 Gripens and 6 GlobalEyes
[60] flyajetfighter.com: The cost of the Dassault Rafale
[61] Indian Defence Research Wing: Rafale Enters ITAR Orbit After LMB Acquisition
[62] Times of Islamabad (2026): France Refuses Source Code Access to India in 114 Rafale Jets Deal
[63] flyajetfighter.com: The real cost per hour of a combat-ready Rafale
[64] Hensoldt: Future proofing the Eurofighter Typhoon (ECRS Mk 1)
[65] Journal of Electromagnetic Dominance (2025): Typhoon Profile -- ECRS Radars Introduce Electronic Attack Functionality
[66] warwingsdaily.com: Maintenance costs of the Rafale, F-35, and Typhoon
[67] Universitat der Bundeswehr Munchen (2013): Military Economics and Cost-Effectiveness Principle (PDF)
[68] Aviation International News (2026): Saab Advocates Mixed Canadian Fleet
[69] Hensoldt: TwInvis -- Passive Radar (product page)
[70] Defense News (2023): Hensoldt Unveils Deployable Package of TwInvis Passive Radar
[71] Zvook: Acoustic Detection System (official website)
[72] United24 Media (2025): Sky Fortress -- Ukraine's Acoustic Detection System
[73] Rheinmetall (2022): The Skyranger 30 HEL
[74] Epirus (2025): Leonidas HPM Defeats 49-Drone Swarm
[75] GPK-N (September 2022): Evaluation Procedure New Combat Aircraft (PDF)
[76] NDB Situation Report 2025 (PDF)